

## Summary

*„Positive und negative Freiheit“ bei Kant? – Wie begriffliche Konfusion auf philosophi(ehistori)sche Abwege führt.*

by Bernd Ludwig

In his theory of transcendental ideas (freedom, God, and the immortality of the soul), Kant distinguishes between positive and negative *concepts* of the possible objects of these ideas. The common confusion of this (semantic) *second* level distinction with a *first* level distinction, i.e. with the distinction between positive and negative *objects* (and in particular in the form of a distinction – totally foreign to Kant – between “positive” freedom and “negative” freedom) not only distorts access to Kant’s theory of freedom and to the architectonic of Kant’s metaphysics as a whole, but also particularly hides Kant’s conception of morals as an integral system of law and ethics within the framework of transcendental idealism.