

Summary

“Bieri über die Zukunft der analytischen Philosophie. Eine unerlässliche Entgegnung”

by Hans-Ulrich Hoche

Bieri answers the heading of his polemic pamphlet, ‘What remains of analytic philosophy?’, by essentially passing his opinion on what *should* remain of it. This shift is, I think, symptomatic for the slight mist of imprecision which permeates many parts of his article. Anyway, it is not all too much that, in his eyes, ought to be retained – first of all, ironically, ‘the standards of clarity and notional lucidity set by analytic philosophy’ (342). Bieri’s principle target is analytic philosophy done in a linguistic key, i.e., linguistic philosophy (though he does not bother to say what analytic philosophy might look like if it were bereft of its linguistic dimension). He seems to take it that the ‘linguistic turn’ has been based on the ‘dogma that all interesting questions of philosophy could be spelled out as questions about words and the logical structure of sentences’ (340). That this is utterly untrue has been shown by J. L. Austin, R. M. Hare, and many others: The proper philosophical scrutiny of words is *eo ipso* a scrutiny of the things they stand for. In other words: The linguistic philosopher does not *confine* himself to scrutinising matters linguistic and logical; only, he pays due attention to such matters, *too*. Bieri believes, however, that there are prominent philosophical problems ‘in dealing with which you won’t get far by doing linguistic analysis’, above all ‘mental causation’ and ‘our will to morally restrict our freedom of action’ (340). As the latter two problems happen to precisely indicate my own main fields of research, in which I have published since decades, I felt challenged to demarcate how, in my opinion, linguistic methods and the use of formalised extended logics can efficiently contribute to philosophical research into mind-body problems and metaethics. As opposed to Bieri’s prejudice that all analytic judgements are as barren as the well-known ‘bachelor’-examples, I refer to my detailed attempts, based on an integrated logic of conviction and intention, to show the analyticity of what I call the ‘Universal Golden Rule’ – though we must not shut our eyes in face of the fact that the conception of analyticity (be it philosophically fertile or barren) has its price, namely, the dependence of analytical truths on the personal ‘idiolectal and imaginative competence’ of the given speaker/hearer.